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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD- SENATE

THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, the
situation in Viet Nam, in the words of
President Johnson, Secretary McNamara
and others, is likely to get worse before
it gets better. What the Secretary will
report to the President as a result of his
week in Viet Nam is, of course, not
known; but it appears that the groundwork has been laid for a further intensification of the military effort in Viet
Nam. Obviously, if this continues the
American presence is going to assume
the predominant role in that conflict.
There is talk of a reserve call up, extended enlistments, added defense appropriations and the like. It is even
anticipated on our side that the war may
go on for 4 or 5 or even 10 years and Ho
Chi Mh;th, President of North Viet Nam,
has stated in the last day or so that he
is prepared for a war of 20 years duration.
It is interesting to note and not surprising that what is occurring in Viet
Nam is now being caled "an American
war" by one columnist and another columnist states that in South Viet Nam :
"It is real war there at last."
The President has gone down many
tracks in an effort to enter into "unconditional discussions" to pave the way
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for negotiations which might end the
hostilities in VietNam. He has met with
silence or rebuffs at every turn. U Thant
has endeavored in a quiet way to use the
facllities of the United Nations. A proposed Commonwealth Group which
would go to Moscow, Peking, Hanoi and
Washington has ben advocated and rebuffed. A representative of the British
Government has gone to Hanoi. Mr.
Mr. Harriman has gone to Moscow ; all
with no success .
It is my understanding that in the immediate past Ho Chi Minh has extended
an invitation to President Nkrumah of
Ghana to come to Hanoi but instead of
Mr. Nkrumah going, he is sending
Ghana's High Commissioner in London.
A glimmer but only a glimmer of hope
may come out of this meeting.
It is of interest, I think, to the American people to note the comments of General Nguyen Cao Ky, the present premier
of South Viet Nam-one of a long line-in a recent TV program with Walter
Cronkite. I do not have the complete
copy of the interview but I am inserting
at the conclusion of my remarks an article by one of the most competent foreign
policy analysts in the nation, Mr. R. H .
Shackford of the Washington Daily
News.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that that be allowed.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
<See exhibit U
Mr. MANSFIELD. It does not make
very reassuring reading. And if there
is any complacency on the part of any
American, it ought to be dispelled by
an exposure to Premier Ky's comments.
What I have stated are grim facts.
What the situation in Viet Nam confronts us with, however, is a grhn fact.
It is better to face up to this problem
than to ignore it in the belief that it
will wash away at the end of the Monsoons. The thne for wishful thinking
is past; the time for accepting the reality
is now. Indeed it has been time for
quite awhile. We are in, not for a summer of pain and difficulty but for an
ordeal of indefinite duration and increasing sacrifice which will persist until
the problem can be resolved at the
Conference table.
Our policies so far have been mostly
in the nature of holding operations,
except for forays of our bombers over
Viet Nam. The air raids have apparently failed to stop the infiltration of
regular and irregular North Vietnamese
units into South Viet Nam but instead,
in my opinion, have har(iened the position of the government and the people
of the North and increased their commitment to this war. As evidence
thereof, the estimates of the number of
active armed Viet Cong has risen sharply
since the beginning of the year, despite
their reported severe losses.
As the war in Viet Nam increases in
tempo, we should keep in mind the possibilities of Communist pressure against
us in other parts of Asia and perhaps
other parts of the world. I have in mind
the uneasy truce which exists in Korea;
the possibility of operations against
Thailand and Laos and elsewhere.
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At the moment the Soviet Union is
fum1shing a certain amount of assistance. The Chinese are providing some
material aid to North VIetNam although
to the best of our knowledge no Chinese
personnel have as yet entered the connlct. But 1l the war continues to escalate, Peking, Moscow and Hanoi wUI
continue to Le drawn more closely together despite any ideological or other
C:it!'erences which at the present time
may exist.
As I see It, the chief beneficiary of
what ls going on In Southeast Asia at
the present time 1s Mainland China.
The Chinese are benefiting from events
there at little cost and with little sweat.
Chinese governments have long been
adept at exercising the virtue of patience
which they have In abundance. They
can walt and walt and wait for events
to develop to their interest.
During the past 10 or 11 years I have
as one Senator, made a number of suggestions to our government as to what
might or might not be done to stabilize
the situation In South Viet Nam, In all
Viet Narn, and also in Cambodia and
Laos. The possibilities of fw·ther
initiatives for peace become slimmer by
the day, even as the alternatives become
more restricted by the hour.
I would like to suggest once again,
therefore, that the co-chairmen of the
Geneva Conference of 1961, that is the
Soviet UnJon and Great Britain, jointly
reconvene the conference for the purpose of discussing the affairs of Laos,
Cambodia, South Viet Nam and North
Viet Narn to the end that all reasonable
and honorable possibllities of peace and
Integrated economic reconstruction and
development In the area may be Investigated.
If It is not possible to call a conference
covering all of the nations of Indochina,
then I would suggest again that the two
co-chairmen reconvene the Geneva Conference along the lines requested by
Prince Norodom Sihanouk for the purpose of considering ways and means by
which the Geneva signatories may at
least guarantee Cambodia's Independence and territorial integrity and this
matter only. If Cambodia can be Insulated from the growing conflict, that,
in Itself, would be a highly significant
achievement for peace In Indo-China
and Southeast Asia.
But I must say in all frankness, at this
time, that a conference based on the consideration of the entire question and
called by the co-chairmen would appear
to me to be a more desirable alternative.
I want to be clear, however, that If such
a conference is not possible or feasible
at this time, then I believe it is still
desirable that a conference on Cambodia alone under the authority of the
co-chairmen of the Geneva Conference
of 1961 should be called.
There has long been a desire for such
a conference on the part of Prince
S!hanouk. He made his position on this
question very clear some weeks ago In
a letter to the New York Times and I
ask unanimous consent that Its text may
be Included at the end of my remarks.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it Is so ordered
<See exhibit No 2.)

I01 AL RECORD- E 'ATE

17115

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President. to- ment hierarchy by pn>mlalng a.n tb~
day, there are reports on the news ticker thorough purge o1 both
Tb.Ls would be t.he umpt.eont.h " pur ~.. Ln
that Pnnce Souvanna Phouma of Laos
the la.st 2 years- the Vletcon& gainln iJ'ound
has urged Britaln to a.rrange a reconven- on
each one.
Ing of the Geneva conference. In thJs
Thlrd more Amerlca.n ora ~ nC«<~ . he
connection I ask unanimous consent that aald, so that the bUill: of the South VIetthe report referred to also be printed at namese Army could ··reorga.nlze \.he rear."
He sugge6Led thM US. troope hold " Ule
the end of my remarks.
The PRESIDING OFFICER Without perlmeter"-apparently meaning do the
tlghtlng
against the VIetcong.
objection, 1t is so ordered
The Ky TV lntenlew wu bTOA.dcaat In t.he
<See exhibit 3 .)
United States while Deren e Secretary RobMr
MANSFIELD Mr
President, ert McNam.ru-a was In Vletna.m. rocel,lng pfinally, I would suggest that !l there !s peals from General Ky and U.S m.lllta.ry omreluctance or reservations or inabilities clals there tor more American ground rorct'S
on the part of one of the cochairmen of
Mr. McNamara's Saigon trip appeared prithe Geneva grouping of 1961, then In marily to be a well-staged operation for preview of the gravity of the Situation. the paring the American people tor more bad
new&--because the decision to send more
other would appear to me to be eminently American
to VIetnam wu made long
justified in issuing the call for a recon- before Mr.troops
McNamara. lett the United States
vening of the conference on Its own. The last week
Geneva agreement of 1961 clearly proThe United States now bas more than
vides for consultations when there are 75,000 uniformed men In VIetnam, plus andifficulties. It would, therefore, be en- other 20,000 olt the shorea or that country
tirely In order, In the light of the great wl ,b the 7th Fleet.
The Joint Chiefs of Stat!' are understood
difficulties at this time, for any particihave recommended that the United States
pating nation, and particularly, one of to
plan to have 179,000 men on the ground In
the cochairmen to issue the call. I do VIetnam by the end of the year.
not see how any State which recognizes
General Ky came closer to disclosing the
the urgent necessity for peace and has dire outlook In Vletnant than any U 8 otllclo.l
President Johnson has said the situation
eyes to see where the present course !n
Vietnam is tending, can refuse to heed wLII get worse before It gets better. But no
U.S
. otllclal bas even hinted, as General Ky
to call for a meeting of thJs kind. But
that tbe war Is eo cl06e to becoming
In any event, there would still be some did,
overwhelmingly an American war
opportunity for the others to make a
The VIetnamese manpower situation long
contribution to the restoration of peace bas been deficient. For years there have
if the conference is convened.
been brave promises ot major recruiting and
Perhaps the hour is late, but the old conscripting-but each campaign has fallen
saying "better late than never" applies short of goals.
The South VIetnamese M!Htary Establishhere and it applies with the greatest of
ment usually Is said to total 550,000 men
force.
Less frequently It Is explained that only
I thank the distinguished Senator 250,000 or those are Regular Army soldiers,
from Wisconsin [Mr. PROXMIRE) for his the rest being various paramilitary units
patience and consideration in yielding ranging all the way down to policemen
to me.
The " numbers game ·• on the VIetcong goes
EXHIBIT 1
[From the Washington (D.C.) Dally News,
JUly 20. 1965 I
GENERAL KY WANTS To "REORGANIZE THE
R£Aa": WINNING VIETNAM WAR Is GoiNG
To BE OI's Jos
(By R. H. Shack!ord)
It Is becoming more obvious each day that
I! the wa.r In VIetnam Is to be won---<>r even
brought to a stalemate--American GI's a.re
going to have to do the bUlk of the Job.
Each day brlngs further evidence that the
South VIetnamese a.re in a bad way, mllltarlly and pol!tlcally. The unthinkable o! a
few months ago--VIetnam becoming an
American wa.r-ls now routinely accepted
here.
South VIetnamese Prernler Gen. Nguyen
Cll() Ky has virtually admitted that the
Americans will have to play a bigger and bigger role In the war Lf It Is to go on.
He Ls the same man who talks with bravado
about "l!berating" North VIetnam while conceding that be cannot "l!berate" th·e south.
General Ky Ls the flamboyant, high l!ving
chief of the VIetnamese Air Force who. !or a.
month, bas been the latest or a long line of
unsuccessful Premiers.
He appeared over the weekend on a. nationwide U.S. television show and gave some
disturbing Information about the sta tu.e of
his country.
First, General Ky conceded that the people
o! South VIetnam a.re "Indifferent" about the
wa.r. Many. be admitted, will not participate Ln the wa.r eltort because they are disgusted with the continuous changes In government Ln Saigon and, t.bus, have no con.l\dence Ln any government.
Second, be promised more confusion
among the VIetnamese military and govern-

on. Last week they were said to have 65 ,000
regUlars. supported by 80,000 to 100.000
Irregulars or part-time euerrlllas.
U.S. otllclals claim that the rate of Infiltration !rom the north, Including Regular North
VIetnamese Army nnlt.s, has Increased rapIdly In recent months. Major "search and
kill" operations, however, have !ailed so far
to flush any large enemy groups !or combat
In the Jungles.
In justifying the huge Increase or U.S.
ground forces In VIetnam and the plans ! o r
more, the United States emphasizes primarIly the larger numbers Invading !rom the
north.
General Ky was the first to Indicate--however Indirectly-that another major reason
tor needing more GI'a Ia the disintegration
In the south.
ExHmrr 2
SmANOUK DIScussES CAMBODIAN CoNFutEN CE

To the Eorroa :
In your May 6 editorial (Internal ed.IUon
May 7) you analyze the reasons which Impelled Cambodia to sever diplomatic relations
with the United States.
You write that this decision stemmed rrom
my convictions that I could avoid v868alage
to China. by paying occasional " political
tribute." A little further you say that I try
to avoid Chinese Interference In my country
by making conceealons to China In foreign
atl'alrs.
You attribute to me sentiments, that are
not at all m.lne, a.nd thua you create 1m unfortunate contusion In the minds of your
readers
Last month I wrote in the monthly review
Knmbuja published In Pnompenh. I have
never had the allgheat Illusion on the tate
that nwalts me at the ha.nct. of the Commu-
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nlata, a.a well as that which Is reeerved tor my
government, atter having removed trom our
region the In!! uence e.nd especially the presence ot the tree world, and the United States
In particular.
In an editorial which will appear shortly In
this same review, I concede again that atter
the disappearance ot the United States !rom
our region and the victory ot the Communist
camp, I myself and the people's Socialist
community that I have created would Inevitably disappear !rom the scene.
I know the Chinese well enough to understand that they cannot be bought and that It
Is perfectly useless to bend before them, or
to play their game occa.sslonally In the hope
ot extracting some ulterior advantage. U I
acted thus, I would be despised, and rightly
so, by the Chinese people, who would not
alter their plans one Iota so tar as my country Ia concerned.
But there Is one thing that you Americans
seem Incapable ot understanding. And that
Ia that Cambodia has broken off with the
United States ot America not because It Is
a "pawn ot Pelplhg," as you write, but tor
reasons ot dignity and national honor that
we have • • • placed on Cambodia, you display obvious spite In saying that the tault
ls mine and that because I allow myselt to
by "maneuvered by Pelplng," the meeting
may not take place.
As tor the prospect ot an International
conference taking place on Cambodia, you let
It be known that the tault lies with me
because I allow myself "to be run by Pelplng,"
that the meeting wlll not take place.
But then you Immediately point out that
this conference was Intended "In part to provide a way tor exploratory conversations on
Vietnam." And this Is repeated and emulated by all press ot the tree world. We
Cambodians have come to the conclusion
that the neutrality ot Cambodia and our territorial Integrity do not concern you at all
and that this conference Is simply, In your
eyes, a good way to sound out the ultimate
Intentions ot the VIetnamese and tl.e Chln~se
ln regard to South VIetnam and that you wlll
link our problem to that ot VIetnam. by refusing to give any guarantee whatever to
Cambodia I! the Communists remain Intransigent on Vietnam.
The Peo ple's Republic ot China, the Soviet
Union, and the Democratic Republic ot
VIetnam have stated clearly their determination not to accept the government ot Saigon
as partner In an International meeting.
We, ourselves, are well aware that the government ot Saigon has lost control ot almost
!our-tl!ths ot the Vietnamese border with
Cambodia, and we are also aware ot the tact
that Saigon persists In claiming the coastal
Khmeres Islands, while the National Liberation Front ot South Vietnam and Hanoi
acknowledge our ownership
Nevertheless-and In an effort to arrive at
a solution In such a dtmc ult context-! advised the British Prime Minister Harold Wilson, who had sent me on May 11 an urgent
message, that Cambodia would accept the
conference on two conditions:
First ot all, that the conference should
concern ltsel! with the Cambodian problem
to the exclus ion ot the Vietnamese or Laotian problem. Then, that the Interested
powers: Great Britain, U.S.S R., the United
States, France, and the People's Republic ot
China, should agree In advance on a solution
which would satlsty all, on the problem ot
the representation ot South VIetnam.
I pointed out to Mr. Wilson that there
were tour posslbllltles: ( 1) that South Vietnam should not be rep-esented at the conference; (2) or shoutd be represented by the
National Liberation Front; (3) or be represented by the Government of Saigon; (4)
or finally be represented bilaterally: one seat
to the NLF, which Is supported by the Socialist camp, and another seat to the Gov-

ernment or Saigon, which Ia backed by the
tree worl<t.
I Informed the British Prime Minister that
Ca.mbodla stands rea.dy In advance to accept
whatever solution regarding the rep.-esentatlon or South VIetnam would be mutually
approved by the great powers or the East and
the West.
This w111 prove to you, I hope, that we are
=ot the puppets or Pelplng and that we do
not put "spokes In any wheels" In order to
defeat a project that the United States has
put so long on "Ice" e.nd which now they
discover has so many merits.
NORODOM SIHANOUK,

Head of State of Cambodia.

PNOMPENH, May 16, 1965.
ExHmrrS

LoNDON.-Premler Prince Souvanna Phouma ot Laos urged Prime MJ..n.l.&ter Harold
Wilson today to help arrange new International talks on Indochina to negotiate !or
peace In Vietnam.
The neutralist Laotian leader, here on a 2day omctal visit, met Wilson and other
British Ministers at lunch In 10 Downing
Street.
Dlploma.ts reported Souva.nna stressed that
so long as the Vietnam war goes on the security ot nea.rby Laos and Cambodia will
remain In jeopardy.
North Vietnamese supply lines to the VIetcong In the south run through Laotian territory controlled by the Red-led Pathet Lao.
This has attracted U.S. bomber attacks on
Laotian territory bordering South VIetnam.
Informants said Souvanna, noting the
tatlure or all efforts to date to bring abOut
a. VIetnam peace parley, suggested the
British and Soviet cochairmen reconvene the
1954 Geneva Conference on Indochina. This
dealt with Vletna.rn, Cambodia, and Laos In
separate settlements. Souvanna, who conferred In Paris yesterday with President
Charles de Gaulle, claimed French backing
tor !lis Idea.
W llson &.lld Foreign Secretary Michael
Stewart were sympathetic to Souva.nna's suggestion but were doubtful whether It would
prove to be effective, the sources said.
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